biome security/noBlankTarget

• Adding `rel="noopener"` after user-defined `rel` values could change the semantic meaning if downstream code relies on the exact ordering of space-separated tokens for parsing or matching.
• If the original `rel` attribute contained a value like `noopener` already, the fix would duplicate it (`rel="noopener noreferrer noopener"`), which is harmless but unnecessarily bloats the attribute.
• When the anchor tag is generated via a template literal or JSX expression spread (`{...props}`), inserting `rel` statically might interfere with dynamic `rel` injection from props if those props also define `rel`, potentially causing conflicts or unexpected precedence.
• The fix does not account for custom components that render an `<a>` internally; applying the fix to such a component would add `rel` to the component itself, which has no effect and may trigger prop-type warnings or errors.
• If the JSX contains comments between `target="_blank"` and the closing `>` (e.g., `<a target="_blank" /* debug */ >`), the fixer might place the new `rel` attribute before or after the comment, altering comment positioning relative to attributes.
• In server-side rendering contexts where the HTML string is later parsed by a browser, injecting `rel="noopener"` could affect how certain browser extensions or security policies interpret the link, though this is generally benign.
• If the anchor tag uses a namespace prefix (e.g., `<svg:a target="_blank">`), the fixer might incorrectly treat it as an HTML anchor and add `rel`, which is invalid in SVG and could break the markup.
• When the `href` attribute value is a JavaScript expression (e.g., `href={userInput}`), the fix does not validate the URL; adding `rel="noopener"` remains safe but does not mitigate risks from unsafe URLs themselves.
• If the element is not actually an anchor (e.g., a custom component that destructures and spreads `target` and `rel` onto a child `<a>`), the fix adds `rel` to the wrong element, leaving the actual anchor unprotected.
• In rare cases where `rel` is used as an event handler name via JSX spreading (`{...{ rel: onClick }}`), the fixer’s insertion of a static `rel` attribute could conflict with or override the dynamic handler, breaking event binding.
• The fix preserves whitespace and formatting loosely; if the original JSX relied on precise formatting for prettier or linter compatibility, the insertion might shift indentation or line breaks in a way that triggers formatting complaints.
• When `allowDomains` is configured, the fix may incorrectly add `rel="noopener"` to links pointing to allowed domains, which under that configuration should remain unchanged, thus over-fixing and deviating from user intent.

match: [
  'href',
  index: 3,
  input: '<a href="/url" target="_blank">click</a>',
  groups: undefined
]

SSR HTML: no rel

Allowed domain, no fix needed

ASI safe: <a href="/url" target="_blank">test</a>

rel is: undefined
Would add rel=noopener

<a href="/url" target="_blank" rel="nofollow">text</a>

<svg:a target="_blank">link</svg:a>

<a href="/url" target="_blank" rel="nofollow">0</a>
<a href="/url" target="_blank">1</a>

nofollow-set